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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
BEAUTY SPEAKING: BEAUTY AND LANGUAGE IN PLOTINUS AND 
AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO 
 Much has been said about the influence of Plotinus, the Platonist philosopher, on 
the ideas of Augustine of Hippo, the Western Church Father whose writings had the 
largest impact on Western Europe in the Middle Ages. This thesis considers both writers’ 
ideas concerning matter, evil, and language. It then considers the way in which these 
writers’ ideas influenced their style of writing in the Enneads and the Confessions. 
Plotinus’ more straightforward negative attitude towards the material word and its 
relationship to the One ultimately makes his writing more academic and less emotionally 
powerful. Augustine’s more complicated understanding of the material world and its 
relationship to God results in a more mystical and more emotionally powerful style, 
which derives its effectiveness especially from its use of antithesis and the first and 
second person. 
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1 
Section One: Introduction 
 A great deal has been written in the past century or so about the extent of the 
influence of Plotinus on Augustine of Hippo’s ideas.1 Less, however, has been written 
about the similarities or differences of style between the two authors. This is certainly 
understandable given that Augustine would have read Plotinus in Latin translation, which 
would dilute something of the character of his style. Still, it is worth considering what 
influence the differences in their ideas might have on the style of these two great 
intellectuals. In an attempt to address this lack in some small way, in this paper I will first 
consider each man’s understanding of the material world, evil, and words, and then 
consider their styles. Ultimately, I hope to show, through close analyses of Enneads I.6.7 
and Confessions X.27.38, that Augustine’s more emotional, more dramatic style arises 
from his belief in a transcendent God, Who, though transcendent, nevertheless creates the 
material world as good, while Plotinus’ simpler, more negative attitude towards the 
material world leads to a less emotionally powerful style. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 For a review of some of the main currents of thought concerning Augustine and Platonism, see John 
O’Meara’s article “The Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine,” in Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. 
Dominic J. O’Meara (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1982), 34-41. 
 2 
Section Two: Plotinus on the Material World 
 This paper will restrict itself to matter in the sensory world and will not discuss 
matter in the intelligible world. Plotinus begins Enneads II.4 “On Matter” with what he 
takes to be the definition of matter generally accepted by philosophers, Th\n legome/nhn 
u(/lhn u(pokei/meno/n ti kai\ u(podoxh\n ei)dw=n, “What is called ‘matter’ is said to be some 
sort of ‘substrate’ and ‘receptacle’ of forms.”2 Matter, then, according to Plotinus, is 
something in need of a form. Matter is somehow influenced by the forms, underlying the 
material world and thus necessary for the forms to be in the material world. Plotinus 
expands on this idea of matter as h( tw=n swma/twn u(podoxh/, “the receptacle of 
bodies.”3 Assuming the veracity of the ancient elemental theory and the possibility of 
bodies changing from one element to another, Plotinus asserts that matter is what stays 
constant and underlies the body. This is necessary because otherwise changes happening 
to material bodies would mean that one thing was entirely destroyed and another created 
entirely anew.4 In order for matter to be able to survive the changes that occur between 
the elements and be what underlies the change without being itself changed, matter must 
be a)o/riston,5 “without boundaries” or “indeterminate.”6 This is because change occurs 
when the ei)=doj, the form, which is what imparts determination and boundary to a thing, 
changes. Matter, then, is “not form,” mh\ ei0=doj.7 Since the Forms are what make up the 
                                                             
2 Plotinus, Enneads II.4: “On Matter,” in Plotinus: Enneads II, ed. and trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 1.1-2.106-7. 
3 Enneads II.4.6.1.116-7. 
4 Enneads II.4.6.2-9.116-9. 
5 Enneads II.4.6.20.118. 
6 LSJ s.v. a)o/ristoj, A. 
7 Enneads II.4.6.20.118-9. 
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Intellect, it seems that matter, lacking form, is the opposite of or at least opposed to the 
intelligible world, towards which Neoplatonism strives.  
 The weakness of matter and of the sensory world can even be seen in Enneads I.6. 
In this treatise, Plotinus makes a distinction between things in the higher world, which are 
ka//llh au)ta/, beauties in themselves, and bodies, which are ou) par ) au)tw=n tw=n 
u)pokeime/nwn kala/…a)lla\ meqe/cei, “not beautiful from their own substrate…but by 
participation.”8 It should be noted that, while A.H. Armstrong, editing the Loeb edition of 
Plotinus’ Enneads, here translates u)pokeime/nwn as “from the nature of the objects 
themselves,”9 this same word in Enneads II.4 means and is translated by Armstrong as 
“substrate.”10 There is in this part of the text, moreover, a similar context to Enneads II.4 
since here too, Plotinus is talking about matter. It is also worth noting that Plotinus 
emphasizes that not only the source of beauty in the sensory world is different, but also 
the quality of the beauty. He does so by referring to the higher beauties using the noun for 
beauty, whereas he refers to sensory beauties using the adjective for beautiful. Thus, 
intelligible beauties are more properly beauty than sensory beauties, which only have 
beauty as a quality, something that can be lost. This potential for sensory beauty to be lost 
is explicitly stated when Plotinus writes Cw/mata me\n ga\r ta\ au)ta\ o(te\ me\n kala/, o(te\ 
de\ ou) kala\ fai/netai, w(j a)/llou o)/ntoj tou= sw/mata ei)=nai, a)/llou de\ tou= kala/, 
“The same bodies appear sometimes beautiful, sometimes not beautiful, so that their 
being bodies is one thing, their being beautiful another.”11 Sensory things can be 
                                                             
8 Plotinus, Enneads I.6 “On Beauty,” in Plotinus Porphyry on Plotinus and Ennead I, ed. and trans. A. H. 
Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 1.13-4.232. 
9 Enneads I.6.1.233. 
10 Enneads II.4.1.107. 
11 Enneads I.6, 1.14-7.232-3. 
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beautiful at one time and not at another since being beautiful is not proper to being a 
body. Thus, sensory objects are capable of being ugly; indeed, they are ugly to the extent 
that they do not participate in form. More than that, sensory matter without form, that is 
to say, pure matter, is described as to\ pa/nth ai)sxro\n,12 utter ugliness. In between this 
utter ugliness and sheer beauty is the partial beauty of most or all of the sensory world, 
which is to\ mh\ krathqe\n u(po\ morfh=j kai\ lo/gou, “not completely dominated by shape 
and formative power.”13 The reason for this is that matter cannot or does not entirely 
receive the form, thus preventing the sensory world from entirely participating in and 
imaging the intelligible world.14 Thus, for Plotinus, since matter is formless and even 
contrary to form, it gets in the way of the form impressed upon it, so that the material 
world fails to sufficiently convey the truth and the beauty of the higher world. 
  
                                                             
12 Enneads I.6, 2.16-7.238. 
13 Enneads I.6, 2.17-8.238-9. 
14 Enneads I.6, 2.18-9.238. 
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Section Three: Plotinus on Evil 
 Plotinus’ negativity toward the sensory world can also be seen in Enneads I.8 “On 
What Are Evils.” In trying to determine what evil is, Plotinus writes, 
Lei/petai toi/nun, ei)/per e)/stin, e)n toi=j mh\ ou)=sin ei)=nai oi(=on ei)=doj ti tou= mh\ 
o)/ntoj o)\n kai\ peri/ ti tw=n memigme/nwn tw=| mh\ o)/nti h)\ o(pwsou=n 
koinwnou/ntwn tw=| mh\ o)/nti, 
 
“So it remains that if evil exists, it must be among non-existent things, as a sort of 
form of non-existence, and pertain to one of the things that are mingled with non-
being or somehow share in non-being.”15 
 
For something to be an evil thing, then, it must have a share in non-being. As Dominic 
O’Meara, speaking about this passage, remarks in Plotinus: An Introduction to the 
Enneads, “The notion of evil as defined by Plotinus as the ‘privation’ or absence of good 
is found in Christian thinkers influenced by Plotinus such as Gregory of Nyssa or 
Augustine. But by ‘privation of the good’ the Christian theologians mean, not an existing 
reality, but a willful turning away of the soul from god. However, evil exists for Plotinus, 
it is matter, even though he also finds, as we shall see, a turning away of soul from the 
good.”16 O’Meara, moreover, defines matter as “metaphysical evil,” writing, “As an 
existing reality which is part of the universe and is the principle of other evils (including 
moral evil), we might call matter ‘metaphysical evil.’”17 Plotinus goes on to further 
specify that non-being here means something that is w(j ei)kw\n tou= o)/ntoj h)\ kai\ e)/ti 
ma=llon mh\ o)/n, “like an image of being or something still more non-existent.”18 For 
Plotinus, the sensory world is just such an image of Being:  
                                                             
15 Plotinus, Enneads I.8 “On What Are Evils,” in Plotinus Porphyry on Plotinus and Ennead I, ed. and 
trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 3.4-7.282-3. 
16 Dominic O’Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 82. 
17 O’Meara, 82. 
18 Enneads I.8.3.8-9.282-3. 
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Tou=to d ) e)sti\ to\ ai)sqhto\n pa=n kai\ o(/sa peri\ to\ ai)sqhto\n pa/qh h)\ u(/steron 
ti tou/twn kai\ w9j sumbebhko\j tou/tij h0\ a)rxh tou/twn h)\ e(/n ti tw=n 
sumplhrou/ntwn tou=to toiou=ton o)/n,  
 
“The whole world of sense is non-existent in this way, and also all sense-
experience and whatever is posterior or incidental to this, or its principle, or one 
of the elements which go to make up the whole which is of this non-existent 
kind.”19 
 
The sensory world, then, since it is non-existent, is evil to Plotinus. It fails to participate 
much in Being, which is the Intellect and Beauty, but rather participates in matter. As 
Benjamin Fuller in The Problem of Evil in Plotinus notes of material bodies, “Evil 
inheres in them as a result of their participation in Matter.  Hence their nature is such that 
it has no true form, is bereft of life, full of internal strife, disordered in its own motion, a 
hindrance to the soul and soul’s activities, and in constant Heracleitean flux.”20 The 
sensory world, then cannot fully or clearly convey the Intellect because it does not fully 
participate in Being and is consequently disordered. Moreover, matter and the material 
world lead, as O’Meara writes, to moral evil, about which more will be said shortly. 
Nor does the sensory world participate fully in Beauty and consequently it cannot 
draw the minds or hearts of those who encounter it up to the intelligible world and even 
less to the One, Who is beyond even Being. This can be seen more clearly when Plotinus 
writes,  
e)/xei me\n ga\r ei)=do/j ti ou)k a)lhqino\n e)ste/rhtai te zwh=j fqei/rei te a)/llhla 
fora/  te par ) au)tw=n a)/taktoj e)mpo/dia/ te yuxh=j pro\j th\n au)th=j 
e)ne/rgeian feu/gei te ou)si/an a)ei\ r(e/onta, deu/teron kakon,  
 
“For bodies have a sort of form which is not true form, and they are deprived of 
life, and in their disorderly motion they destroy each other, and they hinder the 
                                                             
19 Enneads I.8.3.9-13.282-3. 
20 B.A.G. Fuller, The Problem of Evil in Plotinus (London: Cambridge University Press, 1912), 229. 
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soul in its proper activity, and they evade reality in their continual flow, being 
secondary evil.”21  
 
Bodies do not fully participate in the Forms, but rather have false forms, making them 
especially deceptive to souls. It is because of this that bodies get in the way of the soul, 
preventing it from fully actualizing its proper activity, which is the pursuit of and 
contemplation of the intelligible world and what is beyond the intelligible, the One. 
Bodies get in the soul’s way when the soul partakes in the unmeasuredness of bodies.22 
This happens because the soul shifts its focus away from ou)si/a, Being, which is the 
Intellect or the intelligible world, and towards ge/nesij, becoming, the sensible world.23 
Thus, the soul’s contemplative power is shifted away from its proper object, which gives 
it form and order, to an improper object, which gives it formlessness. Speaking of matter, 
Plotinus says, e)comoioi= e(auth=| pa=n o(/ ti a)\n au)th=j prosa/yhtai o(pwsou=n, “it makes 
everything which comes into contact with it in any way like itself.”24 Plotinus writes 
something similar in Enneads II.4 of matter, which is to\ a)/peiron, “On Matter,” Kai\ to\ 
a)/peiron de\ proselqo\n tw=| peperasme/nw| a)polei= au)tou= th\n fu/sin, “And the 
unlimited when it comes to that which is limited will destroy its nature.”25 Thus, matter, 
and consequently the material world, is capable of greatly harming the soul in its ascent 
to the Intellect and the One. 
                                                             
21 Enneads I.8.4.2-6.286-7. 
22 Enneads I.8.4.7-18.286. 
23 Enneads I.8.4.17-21.286. 
24 Enneads I.8.4.24-5.288-9. 
25 Plotinus, Enneads II.4 “On Matter,” in Plotinus II (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 
15.16-7.144-5. 
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Matter, then, is not only metaphysical evil, primary evil, but it leads to evil in the 
soul, or moral evil. Plotinus discusses this moral evil in Enneads IV.8 “The Descent of 
the Soul into Bodies”:  
o(/tan dh\ tou=to dia\ xro/nwn poih=| feu/gousa to\ pa=n kai\ th=| diakri/sei 
a)posta=ja kai\ mh\ pro\j to\ nohto\n ble/ph|, me/roj genome/nh monou=tai/ te kai\ 
a)sqenei= kai\ polupragmonei= kai\ pro\j me/roj ble/pei kai\ tw=| a)po\ tou= o(/lou 
xwrismw=| e(no/j tinoj e)piba=sa kai\ to\ a)/llo pa=n fugou=sa,  
 
“Now when a soul does this for a long time, flying from the All and standing 
apart in distinctness, and does not look towards the intelligible, it has become a 
part and is isolated and weak and fusses and looks towards a part and in its 
separation from the whole it embarks on one single thing and flies from 
everything else.”26 
 
Thus, when the soul spends too long with matter and the material world, it is made weak 
and gets distracted from the higher world of spiritual realities, to\ pa=n, “The All,” by its 
love and fascination with the sensory world. A little further on, he writes, 
e)/nqa kai\ sumbai/nei au)th|= to\ lego/menon pterorruh=sai kai\ e)n desmoi=j toi=j 
tou= sw/matoj gene/sqai a(martou/sh| tou= a)blabou=j tou= e)n th=| dioikh/sei tou= 
krei/ttonoj, o(/ h)=n para\ th=| yuxh=| th=| o(/lh|,  
 
“Here the ‘moulting’, as it is called, happens to it, and the being in the fetters of 
the body, since it has missed the immunity which it had when it was with the 
universal soul directing the better part [of the universe].”27  
 
Thus, this distraction from the higher realities leads to the soul being chained to a 
particular body, rather than directing all of the universe. Moreover, this being chained to 
the body means that the soul is pro\j tw=| desmw=| ou)=sa kai\ th=| ai)sqh/sei e)nergou=sa dia\ 
to\ kwlu/esqai tw=| nw=| e)nergei=n katarxa/j, “is engaged with its fetter, and acts by sense 
because its new beginning prevents it from acting by intellect.”28 Thus, the soul, 
                                                             
26 Plotinus, Enneads IV.8 “On The Descent of the Soul into Bodies,” in Plotinus IV, ed. and trans. A. H. 
Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 4.13-8.408-9. 
27 Enneads IV.8.4.22-5.408-11. 
28 Enneads IV.8.4.27-8.410-1. 
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becoming fascinated by material things, can only operate in terms of the sensory world, 
the world composed by material objects, because this fascination with material things 
hinders it from perceiving the spiritual realities, where lies true Beauty, as opposed to the 
false allure of mere sensory beauty. The material world, then, is not merely a positive evil 
for Plotinus, but it is even the cause of moral evil in the soul. 
It may be objected that there are points at which Plotinus presents a more positive 
view of the material universe, as, for example, when he is arguing against the Gnostics; 
his overall attitude, however, towards matter is entirely negative, as has been shown. In 
the case of Enneads II.9 “Against the Gnostics,” the treatise is, as its title suggests, part of 
a polemical tract aimed against the Gnostics, which A.H. Armstrong refers to as an “un-
Hellenic heresy (as it was from the Platonist as well as the orthodox Christian point of 
view).”29 Plotinus is more concerned with combatting an opposing philosophy than with 
presenting his precise ideas about evil and the material world. As Armstrong notes when 
discussing the Platonists’ objection to the Gnostics, “Worst of all, they despise and hate 
the material universe and deny its goodness and the goodness of its maker. This for a 
Platonist is utter blasphemy, and all the worse because it obviously derives to some 
extent from the sharply other-wordly side of Plato’s own teaching (e.g. in the Phaedo).”30 
Thus, this tendency to a negative attitude towards the material world is clearly a feature 
of Platonism, albeit one that Plotinus does not want to fully admit, since it would, at least 
according to the Gnostic formulation, require that the One and Intellect be less than 
entirely good.  
                                                             
29 A. H. Armstrong, Introduction to Enneads II.9 “Against the Gnostics,” by Plotinus, in Ennead II 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 220. 
30 Introduction to Enneads II.9, 221. 
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Moreover, Armstrong acknowledges that the positive attitude displayed in this 
treatise is more often a feature of Christianity than Platonism when he writes, “At this 
point in his attack Plotinus comes very close in some ways to the orthodox Christian 
opponents of Gnosticism, who also insist that this world is the good work of God in his 
goodness.”31 Even the passage in Enneads I.8 “On What are Evils” to which O’Meara 
refers when he writes, “The same very positive attitude to the world is found a little later 
in the last words of the treatise where Plotinus explores the idea of matter as absolute 
evil,”32 seems more to serve to illustrate the opposition of the good of the spiritual world 
to the evil of the material world than that the material world is good in itself. The passage 
to which he refers is I.8.15.23-9, the very end of Enneads I.8:  
To\ de\ kako\n ou) mo/non e)sti\ kako\n dia\ du/naming a)gaqou= kai\ fu/sin: e)pei/per 
e)fa/nh e)c a)na/gkhj, perilhfqe\n desmoi=j tisi kaloi=j, oi(=a desmw=tai/ tinej 
xrusw=|, kru/ptetai tou/tpoij, i(/n ) a)/mousa mh\ o(rw=|to toi=j qeoi=j, kai\ 
a)/nqrwpoi e)/xoien mh\ a)ei\ to\ kakon\ ble/pein, a)ll ) o(/tan kai\ ble/pwsin, 
ei)dw/loij tou= kalou= ei)j a)na/mnhsin sunw=sin, 
 
“But because of the power and nature of good, evil is not only evil; since it must 
necessarily appear, it is bound in a sort of beautiful fetters, as some prisoners are 
in chains of gold, and hidden by them, so that it may not appear in its 
charmlessness to the gods, and men may be able not always to look at evil, but 
even when they do look at it, may be in company with images of beauty to remind 
them.”33  
 
Thus, Plotinus uses the metaphor of fetters of gold to describe the beauty found in the 
material world. Ultimately, however, even fetters of gold are fetters and the man held by 
them is still a prisoner, as the slaves in Thomas More’s Utopia would discover in the 
Renaissance. Even if there is some beauty in material things, this beauty is something 
                                                             
31 Introduction to Enneads II.9, 221. 
32 O’Meara, 87. 
33 Enneads I.8.15.23-9.316-7. 
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added to the evil that is matter by the Good to help draw the soul away from the material 
world and back up to the spiritual world. The material beauty is meant to do this by 
reminding the soul of its former glory apart from the material world. Thus, even in those 
places where Plotinus presents a more positive attitude towards the material world, his 
overall attitude towards it is a negative one. This being the case, it seems natural that 
Plotinus has a less than positive attitude towards words and writing, since they are 
sensory things partaking of the evil inherent in all material things, as will be seen in the 
following. 
  
 12 
Section Four: Plotinus on Words 
Evidence for Plotinus’ tendency to look down on the sensory world can be found 
in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus. Indeed, the first sentence of the Life expresses this very 
clearly: Plwti=noj o( kaq ) h(ma=j gegonw\j filo/sofoj e)w/kei me\n ai)sxunome/nw| o(/ti e)n 
sw/mati ei)/h, “Plotinus, the philosopher of our times, seemed ashamed of being in the 
body.”34 In the same section of the Life, Porphyry relates Plotinus’ aversion to having a 
painting or sculpture made of himself. Indeed, Porphyry relates that on this subject 
Plotinus said,  
ou) ga\r a)rkei= fe/rein o(\ h( fu/sij ei)/dwlon h(mi=n perite/qeiken, a0lla\ kai\ ei)/dw/lou 
ei)/dwlon sugxwrei=n au)to\n a)ciou=n poluxroniw/teron katalipei=n w(j dh/ ti 
tw=n a)cioqea/twn e)/rgon,  
 
“Why really, is it not enough to have to carry the image in which nature has 
encased us, without your requesting me to agree to leave behind me a longer-
lasting image of the image, as if it was something genuinely worth looking at.”35  
 
Thus, Plotinus’ contempt for the material world seems, at least on Porphyry’s account, to 
extend to man-made images of the sensory world. Indeed, Plotinus seems especially 
opposed to man-made images since they are images of images and thus even less capable 
of conveying intelligible reality than the original sensory objects. Spoken words, 
however, being signs, are images of other things and sometimes images of images, when 
they are signs of material things. Written words, like the words of the Enneads, are even 
further removed from intelligible reality since they are images of spoken words. Words, 
spoken or written, are even more imperfect in their expression of other things since they 
are signs invented by human beings and thus do not have even a natural correspondence 
                                                             
34 Porphyry, “On the Life of Plotinus and the Order of His Books,” in Plotinus Porphyry on Plotinus and 
Ennead I, ed. and trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 1.1-2.2-3. 
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to the things they signify, whereas a painting or sculpture would at least be capable of 
showing Plotinus in the way he appears. Moreover, Plotinus seems in Porphyry’s account 
to be somewhat hesitant to write his ideas down. He wrote twenty four of his treatises 
while Porphyry was with him and at Porphyry’s instigation.36 Porphyry also asserts that 
the best treatises were those written while he was with Plotinus.37 Thus, Plotinus’ disdain 
for the material world extends to writing and results, unless influenced by someone like 
Porphyry with greater interest in writing, in less well-written pieces. Indeed, he does not 
seem entirely confident about the power of words to convey truth, at least truth about the 
One.  
Plotinus’ hesitancy about the power of words to convey the truth about the One 
can be seen in Plotinus’ last treatise in Book Six of the Enneads when he writes about 
speaking about the One, h)\ ou)de\m qaumasto\n mh\ r(a/|dion ei)pei=n ei0=nai, o(/pou mhde\ to\ o)\n 
r(a/|dion mhde\ to\ ei)=doj: a)ll ) e)/stin h(mi=n gnw=sij ei)/desin e)pereidome/nh, “There is 
nothing surprising in its being difficult to say, when it is not even easy to say what Being 
or Form is; but we do have a knowledge based upon the Forms.”38 For Plotinus, then, not 
only is it difficult, if not impossible to speak of the One, but it is even difficult to speak of 
the Intellect, the Forms. Of form at least, it is possible to have knowledge, since things in 
the material world can have some participation, albeit weak, in them. Since, however, as 
he proceeds to discuss, the One is beyond any form, it is difficult for the soul to even 
know for certain that the One is anything, and so the soul, tired out from attempting to 
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touch the One, goes away from it, uncertain whether the One even exists.39 Since, then, 
the One is without form, in order to attain the One, the soul must do so, ou) prostiqe/nta 
ai)/qhsin ou)demi/an ou)de/ ti par ) au)th=j ei)j e)kei=non dexo/menon, a)lla\ kaqarw=| tw=| nw=| 
to\ kaqarw/taton qea=sqai kai\ tou= nou= tw=| prw/tw|, “without adding any sense-
perception or receiving anything from sense-perception into that Intellect, but beholding 
the most pure with the pure Intellect, and the primary part of Intellect.”40 Thus, the man 
seeking the One must remove his attention from sense perception. As such, Plotinus 
advises the use of negation in approaching the One with the Intellect, since the One is 
none of the things it causes.41 One of the clearest expressions of his thought about speech 
and the One that Plotinus gives is a)ll ) h(ma=j oi)=on e)/cwqen periqe/ontaj ta\ au)tw=n 
e(rmhneu/ein e)qe/lein pa/qh o(te\ me\n e)ggu/j, o(te\ de\ a)popiptontaj ta=ij peri\ au)to\ 
a)pori/aij, “but we run round it outside, in a way, and want to explain our own 
experiences of it, sometimes near it and sometimes falling away in our perplexities about 
it.”42 Thus, people can never really describe the One. The closest people can come is to 
talk about their experience of the One, which is what Plotinus does to some extent in 
Enneads I.6 “On Beauty,” except that he does not talk in particular terms of his own 
experience of the One, which might have been more powerful and expressive, but only in 
general terms of the experience of the soul seeking to ascend to the One. Moreover, not 
even material beauty can be used to help one ascend to the One, a)ll ) a)posth=nai dei= kai\ 
e)pisth/mhj kai\ e)pisthtw=n kai\ panto\j a)/llou kai\ kalou= qea/matoj, “but one must 
                                                             
39 Enneads VI.9.3.4-10.310. 
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depart from knowledge and things known, and from every other, even beautiful, object of 
vision.”43Thus, not only material things cannot be used to ascend to the One, but even 
knowledge, which would seem to belong primarily to the Intellect, cannot be used. 
Beauty, at least in material things, and perhaps even in the realm of the Forms, cannot 
help one to ascend to the One. Rather, the soul must proceed by negation, removing its 
attention from beautiful things. 
  
                                                             
43 Enneads VI.9.4.9-10.314-5. 
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Section Five: Enneads  I.6.7 “On Beauty” Analysis 
 In Enneads I.6.7, Plotinus describes the ascent to the Good, which is also Beauty, 
and the experience of the Good for the one who has attained it. The Good is an object of 
desire for those who are ascending to it. In order to attain the Good, it is necessary to do 
the opposite of what was done in the descent to the sensory world; the one ascending 
must free himself from attachment to worldly things. When he attains the Good, he 
experiences himself alone with the Good. Plotinus then describes the ecstatic experience 
of the Good. 
 Plotinus writes very impersonally in this passage. In the very first line of the 
passage,  )Anabate/on ou)=n pa/lin e)pi\ to\ a)gaqo/n, ou(= o)re/getai pa=sa yuxh/,44 “So there 
must again be an ascending to the good, of which every soul is desirous.”45 There is no 
personal pronoun present in Plotinus’ introductory sentence; instead, Plotinus uses the 
impersonal verbal adjective  )Anabate/on with an understood e)stin for the main verb. 
Plotinus is not speaking in terms of his own experience or desire in this sentence, but 
impersonally and abstractly. Even when an actual verb is used in the subordinate relative 
clause, it is a third person verb. The reason for this impersonality is suggested by the 
subject of the verb, pa=sa yuxh.  Plotinus is speaking impersonally in order to generalize 
to the experience of every soul. His own experience is not very important, except insofar 
as it is a starting point for understanding what every soul experiences and does in its 
ascent to the One. It is also worth noting that in this passage, he has separated the soul 
from its body. It is not the person, with its body, who seeks the Good, but just the soul. 
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Indeed, the body is only a hindrance, as can be seen later in this passage. In the next 
sentence Plotinus writes, Ei)/ tij ou0=n ei0=den au)to/, oi0=den o(/ le/gw, o(/pwj kalo/n, “Anyone 
who has seen it knows what I mean when I say that it is beautiful.”46 Plotinus does use a 
verb with a first person subject, but this is only in the relative clause, not in the main 
clause. Furthermore, it is said almost as an interjection and the sentence still has 
essentially the same meaning without it. The first person of the verb is not used because 
Plotinus is discussing his own experience, but only with reference to Plotinus’ words or 
ideas. Moreover, in the following sentence, Plotinus here uses an adjective with a passive 
sense,  )Efeto\n, with an understood estin, “It is desired.”47 Although at the end of the 
sentence there is a first person verb, h)mfiesmeqa, “we put on,”48 this verb is plural 
because it is referring generally to all people. It does not refer specifically to Plotinus’ 
experience.  It is not even referring just to those who have experienced the upward ascent 
to the One, but rather to the metaphorical action of clothing themselves with flesh and 
fleshly desires as all men did in the process of descending to the sensory world. When 
referring to the actions involved in the ascent, Plotinus uses the nouns e)/fesij and teu=cij, 
“desire” and “attainment,”49 or uses plural active (or middle with an active meaning) 
participles without any noun attached to make them specify an individual: a)nabai/nousi, 
e)pistrafei=si, and a0poduome/noij, “for those who go up,” “[for those who] are 
converted,” and “[for those who] strip off.”50 These nouns and participles help contribute 
to the generality and unspecificity of the passage. 
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The metaphor of clothing, furthermore, points to the fact that Plotinus does not 
conceive of the material body as something essential to a human being, but rather as 
something extra added on after the human soul had already been created. This is very 
different from the Christian idea, wherein the material is an essential part of the human 
being. 
 Plotinus proceeds to use a simile to describe the ascent of the soul. Before 
describing the simile, however, it should be noted that this simile does not describe the 
Good itself but rather the soul ascending to the One. Plotinus here avoids describing the 
Good by using physical language that refers to or suggests physical or sensory objects. 
The simile compares the soul ascending to the vision of the One to someone being 
initiated into mystical rites. Indeed, the similarity between the two is so close that it 
almost seems as though Plotinus is really suggesting that the deeper meaning of the rites 
is what the soul does in its ascent; or that the two actions are aiming at attaining a similar 
goal, attainment of the divine, by a similar means, the removal of material things. This 
removal may be a physical removal of the actual physical objects or removal from the 
soul of the attachment to these material things. The simile is introduced before it properly 
begins with the word oi(=on, “just as,”51 when Plotinus uses words for clothing, 
h)mfiesmeqa, and unclothing the soul, a0poduome/noij, to refer to the process by which the 
soul ascends to the One. The simile uses words of ascent, different forms of a)/neimi,52 for 
the entrance into ta\ a(/gia tw=n i(erw=n, “the celebrations of sacred rites.”53 Necessary for 
these rites are ceremonial cleansings and the removal of garments, so that the initiate can 
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enter into the rites clean and naked, being himself alone without anything else.54 
Similarly, the soul ascending to the One must remove from itself all attachment to things 
in the sensory world since these things drag the soul down by distracting it from the 
higher things, the intellectual and the hyperintellectual world. Things of the sensory 
world are described as a)llo/trion tou= qeou=, other than God.55 Sensory things, then, are a 
great danger to the one ascending to the One. Thus, in the ascent to the One, the soul 
itself must separate itself from all that is not the One and become one like the One, 
independent of all attachment. Ultimately, the soul ascending to the One even needs to 
become one in the sense that it has put off discursive thought in favor of the higher 
hyperintellectual vision of the One. This likeness to the One is suggested especially 
strongly when Plotinus writes, au)tw=| mo/nw| au)to\ mo/non i)/dh|, “one sees with one’s self 
alone that alone.”56 This likeness to the One is what allows it to see the One. The sense 
organs could never allow the soul to perceive the One, who is beyond the senses, since 
sensation and knowledge occur through similarity. That the stripping off of the world is a 
becoming like the One is further suggested by the adjectives used to describe the One: 
ei)likrine/j, a(plou=n,  kaqaro/n, “simple, single, and pure.”57 The One has nothing at all 
mixed in it, neither intellectual things nor sensory things, as someone who has removed 
garments of attachment to the sensory world is himself not mixed with passions for 
material things. The last of the three adjectives, kaqaro/n, especially points to the fact 
that the cleansing of the soul is a means of becoming like the One. This is especially clear 
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because the word seems more properly applied to the soul than to the One. The One has 
no need to be cleansed because it has never been soiled by anything. The One is, if 
anything, beyond being described as clean; it has never been cleaned because it has never 
been in need of being cleaned. It is rather the human soul that must be cleansed because it 
has soiled itself with things of the sensory world. 
 Similarly, even when Plotinus comes to speak of the One itself, he speaks of it in 
terms that actually point more to everything other than the One. Plotinus writes, a)f )ou9= 
pa/nta e)ch/rthtai kai\ pro\j au)to\ ble/pei kai\ e)/sti kai\ zh=| kai\ noei=, “from which all 
depends and to which all look and are and live and think.”58 The subject here is pa/nta, 
“all,” not the One. Even as everything focuses on the One, the sentence focuses on 
everything but the One. Everything depends on the One and looks toward it, but the One 
itself, as the adjectives discussed above suggest, is completely free of dependency or 
concern with anything other than itself. It is the source of being, life, and thought in all 
things that have being, life, and thought, but it is itself other than being, thought, or life. 
In order to be the source and cause of all these things, it has to be none of them. When 
Plotinus comes to speak of it as cause, the One is finally the subject, but the focus is still 
on everything other than the One: zwh=j ga\r ai)/tioj kai\ nou= kai\ tou= ei0=nai, “for it is the 
cause of life and mind and being.”59 The One is not presented as in any way acting or 
choosing to act in order to be the cause of all things. Describing the One as a cause does 
not so much affirm something of the One itself but only shows the relationship of other 
things to it. Indeed, this relationship seems at times to be largely one-sided: things are 
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related to and caused by the One, as suggested by the fact that the subject of most of the 
verbs here is everything but the One, but the One is not really related to things. 
Otherwise, it would depend on lower, contingent things; it would be in their power, 
which, for Plotinus, can never be true of the relationship of something ontologically 
higher to something ontologically lower. 
 In the following lines, which constitute what is arguably the most rhetorically 
powerful passage in Enneads I.6, it is not the One who is described, but the lover of the 
One and his experience of the One. Plotinus heightens the emotion in this passage with 
the repetition of poi/ouj, “what”: Tou=to ou)=n ei)/ tij i)/doi, poi/ouj a)\n i)/sxoi e)/rwtaj, 
poi/ouj de\ po/qouj, boulo/menoj au)tw=| sugkerasqh=nai, pw=j d ) a)\n <ou)k> e)kplagei/h 
meq ) h(donh=j;, “If anyone sees it, what passion will he feel, what longing in his desire to 
be united with it, what a shock of delight.”60 The strength of poi/ouj comes from its 
indefinite character. It does not specify, giving certainty, but rather shows the 
indescribability of the things referred to by the indefiniteness of the adjective. The plural 
is also used skillfully here to further the indefiniteness by implying a multiplicity of 
passions experienced by the lover. Moreover, poi/ouj introduces an indirect question, 
which does not so much expect an answer, as lend a sense of wonder to the passage, as 
quam or qualis does at times in Latin. As far back as Homer, poi/ouj is seen used to 
express surprise.61 
 The same sentence has verbs suggesting sensory experience, i)/doi, “see,” and 
i)/sxoi, “feel.” The sentence, and the action indicated in it, begins with sight. The human 
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must first perceive the One before he can be consciously, if that is the right word, 
affected by it. Plotinus is thus using a word indicative of sensory experience to describe 
interaction with the One; however, it is the human who is doing the perceiving in this 
passage. Moreover, sight is used metaphorically since the One cannot be seen with 
physical, human eyes. Sight as a metaphor for intellectual or supra-intellectual perception 
is found in most languages. Thus, the sensory nature i)/doi of is not greatly felt. The verb 
i)/sxoi, for its part, is a very emotionally powerful word, indicating reception of and 
susceptibility to something.62 It can even have a sexual connotation.63 A similar emphasis 
on love, even desiring love similar to sexual love, can be seen with the objects of i)/sxoi, 
e)/rwtaj and po/qouj. This use of erotic language is similar to Augustine’s use of erotic 
language throughout Confessions X.27.38. Thus, when the soul perceives the one, it 
experiences something akin to the passion of a lover for his beloved. The intensity of 
po/qouj is especially strong; it refers to a “longing” or “yearning…for something absent 
or lost.”64 Thus, the one who sees the One still does not fully possess it and thus he longs 
to have it. That this word is not merely signifying love apart from longing is suggested 
both by its inclusion when another word had already been used for love and by the words 
that follow: boulo/menoj au)tw|= sugkerasqh=nai, 65 “desiring to be combined with it.”66 
Desire to be combined with the One is associated with the sight of the One. It is worth 
noting that sugkerasqh=nai, while meaning primarily to be mixed, can also have a 
transferred sense in which it denotes both the combining of mind and heart in friendship 
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and the union that occurs between spouses.67 Thus, not only is erotic imagery being used 
with reference to the soul’s side of the relationship with the One, but with it is coming an 
emphasis on the person’s need for an intimate, even personal relationship with the One. 
The One, on the other hand, does not care whether or not it has the human being and, not 
being a person, cannot fulfill, let alone desire the soul, in any personal sense. It should 
also be noted that neither verb has the One as its agent. In the case of the second verb, the 
object of the verb is not the One either, but rather the love directed towards the One. 
Thus, if anything, the human is being acted upon by love, not by the One. The human 
being is the lover; the One is the beloved. The One is not described as actively 
experiencing love the way the human lover does. It only has this love directed towards 
itself; moreover, it is not even affected by this love. 
In a similar fashion, passionate language is used further on in the sentence to 
describe the pleasure of perceiving the one when Plotinus writes, pw=j d ) a)\n <ou)k> 
e)kplagei/h meq ) h(donh=j;68 “how greatly would he be struck with pleasure?”69 e)kplagei/h 
can be used when speaking “ of any sudden, overwhelming passion.”70 The lover is 
intensely struck with love of the One. As above, where i)/sxoi carried a sense of passivity, 
here, where the verb is actually passive, it is still not the One who is the agent, but rather 
the pleasure. The One is detached from the human experience of it. Thus, the most 
powerful passage in Enneads I.6 shows both a focus on the human instead of on the One 
and an abundance of sensory, even erotic language, something that seems contrary to 
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Plotinus’ usual negative attitude toward the sensory world and more in line with 
Augustine’s positive understanding of and attitude toward the sensory world. Plotinus, 
however, while using erotic language in Enneads I.6, uses less of it and less strongly than 
Augustine, whose entire passage, as will be seen, overflows with such language. 
Augustine will, moreover, use erotic language to refer to both God and the human being, 
making the relationship between them more intimate. 
 Plotinus now comes to the part of the passage especially reminiscent of 
Augustine’s Confessions X.27.38:  )/Esti ga\r tw|= me\n mh/pw i)do/nti o)re/gesqai w(j 
a)gaqou=: tw=| de\ i)do/nti u(pa/rxei e)pi\ kalw|= a)/gasqai/ te kai\ qa/mbouj pi/mplasqai meq ) 
h(donh=j, “The man who has not seen it may desire it as good, but he who has seen it 
glories in its beauty and is full of wonder and delight.”71 Once more, Plotinus uses a 
bodily metaphor for the soul moving towards the One, since o)re/gesqai initially has the 
meaning of stretching one’s hand out toward something.72 This meaning is then 
transferred to signify the act of desiring or yearning, but the image of physically reaching 
for something cannot be separated from the word.73 The person who only desires the 
good seeks something he does not have in any way, since he does not even see the One. 
Thus, he does not have something to be happy about; unlike the One, he is incomplete, 
missing the sight of the One that is essential to true happiness. Moreover, he can only 
conceive of the One as abstractly good. He can see that the One is good or even the 
Good, but he cannot know in the core of his being just how good and amazing it is. The 
one who has experienced the One, who has seen the One with the eyes of his mind, sees 
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the One as not merely the Good, but as Beauty. Beauty for Plotinus seems here to 
indicate something that brings about astonishment, even ravishing delight. It should be 
noted that even as Plotinus describes the intense experience of the One as Beauty, the 
focus is still on the one experiencing and not on the One experienced. This can be seen 
even more by considering pi/mplasqai meq ) h(donh=j. Plotinus describes the soul that sees 
the One as filled with pleasure, not as filled with the One. As will be seen later, in a 
similar passage of the Confessions, the focus is not primarily on Augustine but on God, 
even as Augustine discusses his own experience of God as Beauty 
 Plotinus then proceeds to use a pair of opposites in what may be the most 
powerful phrase in Enneads I.6.7: e)kplh/ttesqai a)blabw=j, “enduring a shock which 
causes no hurt.”74 e)kplh/ttesqai has as its most basic meaning being struck or driven 
out.75 It is thus associated with an act of violence and yet is cause the soul no harm. 
Plotinus thus draws the reader’s mind away from the basic material meaning of words by 
negating, or at least qualifying, the first word, e)kplh/ttesqai, with the following word, 
a)blabw=j. Plotinus wants the reader to realize that this is not a merely physical 
wounding that can only cause harm, but rather something beyond that that heals even as it 
pierces into the soul’s depths. The pair of contraries together presents the reader with 
something far more powerful than either one of the contraries on its own, because it 
makes the mind go into the empty space in between the two words, where mental 
concepts are less clearly defined, as the One is not definable by concepts in the human 
mind. The mind is driven from the light of the intelligible to the unknowable darkness 
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where the One dwells and is astonished to find in that darkness a light that dazzles the 
eyes of his soul. It is surprising that having made such a powerful phrase with opposites 
Plotinus does not continue to use such a method to move the seeking soul up to the One, 
but only uses contraries this once in the passage. As we will see later, Augustine uses this 
opposition of contraries several time in the “Sero te amavi passage” and throughout the 
Confessions, which contributes a great deal to the rhetorical power of that work. 
Moreover, whereas Plotinus uses this pair of opposites to describe the ascending soul’s 
experience of the One, Augustine uses it not only to describe the soul, but perhaps even 
more to speak God Himself. In speaking primarily of the soul’s experience here, one has 
to wonder if the attention does not get shifted away from the One to the individual; that is 
to say, it is not clear whether the more likely effect of reading this passage would be for 
the soul to desire to seek the One for its own sake or for the soul to desire to seek the One 
in order that it might experience the ecstasy of union with the One. It should also be 
noted that in this passage Plotinus speaks in general of a soul’s ascent to the One. He 
does not speak of his own ascent to or experience of the One. This absence of Plotinus’ 
own experience from the text removes some of the personal drama it could have. 
 Vision of the One causes the one who sees the One to despise all other beautiful 
things. In his exultation over Beauty, the human comes to reject all of the things that 
seem beautiful: tw=n a)/llwn e)rw/twn katagela=n kai\ tw=n pro/sqen nomizome/nwn 
kalw=n katafronei=n, “he laughs at all other loves and despises what he thought 
beautiful before.”76This recognition of Beauty Itself makes the human despise other 
beauties. They no longer seem beautiful to him, even if they are images of Beauty. This 
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rejection of sensory beauty in favor of the higher beauty can also be seen further on in the 
passage when Plotinus writes,  
Ou) ga\r o( xrwma/twn h)\ swma/twn kalw=n mh\ tuxw\n ou)de\ duna/mewj ou)de\ 
a)rxw=n ou)de\ o( basilei/aj mh\ tuxw\n a)tuxh/j, a)ll ) o( tou/tou kai\ mo/nou, u(pe\r 
ou(= th=j teu/cewj kai\ basilei/aj kai\ a)rxa\j gh=j a(pa/shj kai\ qala/tthj kai\ 
ou)ranou= proe/sqai xrew/n, ei) katalipw/n tij tau=ta kai\ u(peridw\n ei)j e)kei=no 
strafei\j i)/doi,  
 
“A man has not failed if he fails to win beauty of colours or bodies, or power or 
office or kingship even, but if he fails to win this and only this. For this he should 
give up the attainment of kingship and of rule over all earth and sea and sky, if 
only by leaving and overlooking them he can turn to That and see.”77 
 
 There seems, then, to be less of a relationship between beautiful things and Beauty Itself 
than one might otherwise expect. By contrast, Augustine’s experience of God as Beauty 
will lead him to recognize the other things as good and beautiful in themselves, even if 
they are lesser goods than God Himself. Plotinus, though, seems to have a more exclusive 
viewpoint; either the One is Beauty or the sensory world is beautiful; an individual must 
delight in either the One or in beautiful things, not both. 
 Plotinus uses a great deal of hypotactical organization in Enneads I.6.7. The first 
sentence starts with ou)=n, a particle connecting the present sentence to the previous one. 
Similarly, the first sentence also uses the relative ou9=. While relatives are present in almost 
every writing style, Plotinus in Enneads I.6.7 uses a great deal more relative pronouns 
than Augustine in the “sero te amavi” passage, producing a much more layered, diffuse 
style. The next sentence uses a relative o(/ in correlation with o(/pwj in a way that 
Augustine does not use relatives in the main passage considered in this paper. This gives 
Plotinus a much more cultured, abstracted style, a style distanced from his material. He is 
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treating his subject matter academically, or philosophically, removed from the real 
experience of it. The next sentence has a use of the particles me\n with de\ which is very 
characteristic of Greek prose. These words give Greek writing a very cultured, balanced 
style. Particles, indeed, are perhaps what distinguishes Greek from Latin prose most 
greatly, giving the nuance to the organized Greek style. It is not the style of someone who 
is in the raptures of love or Beauty, but the cool, analytical style of a philosopher. 
Plotinus’ use of hypotaxis can be seen especially clearly later in the sentence with its 
weight of participles carrying the force of a series of subordinate clauses: a)nabai/nousi, 
e)pistafei=si, a)poduome/noij, and katabai/nontej. That these participles have a weight 
and verbal meaning more than simply adjectival can be seen especially clearly in the case 
of a)nabai/nousi and a)poduome/noij. The first word has an entire prepositional phrase 
hanging from it and the second has a relative clause depending on it, a relative clause, 
moreover, containing another participle in addition to a verb. Moreover, the sentence 
does not actually end with h)mfie/smeqa, which is only at the end of one member of the 
sentence. Rather, an entire simile follows on this first part of the sentence. Within this 
simile, there are nouns that carry a verbal sense: kaqa/rseij and a)poqe/seij, 
“purifications” and “strippings off.”78 a)poqe/seij even has an objective genitive hanging 
from it, i(mati/wn, “of the clothes,”79 an objective genitive, moreover, that is qualified by 
an article attached to an adverb, tw=n pri\n, “they wore before.”80 The sentence does not 
even end with this members, but has two more members before the sentence actually 
ends. The next two member, moreover, demonstrate a similar abundance of 
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subordination, attained with participles and nouns implying entire clauses and actual 
relative clauses. 
  
 30 
Section Six: Augustine on the Material World 
 In contrast to Plotinus’s mostly negative attitude towards the material world, 
Augustine presents a more balanced view of the material world as both good, beautiful, 
and connected to the spiritual world, while still of less importance than the spiritual 
world. In his Confessions, it becomes clear that Augustine arrived at this balanced view 
through his interaction with and reaction to Manicheanism and its tendency, like that of 
the Platonism of Plotinus, to present a negative view of matter. As Henry Chadwick 
remarks in Augustine: A Very Short Introduction, “The religion of Mani, or Manicheism, 
expressed in poetic form a revulsion from the material world and became the rationale for 
an ultra-ascetic morality.”81 Indeed, “Above all, the Manichees urged that they had the 
only satisfactory answer to the problem of evil: it was an ineradicable force inherent in 
the physicality of the material world.”82 Thus, as for Plotinus, for Manicheanism matter is 
the cause of evil and is not to be trusted or relied upon. Chadwick says moreover that 
“Mani denied any authority to the Old Testament with its presupposition of the goodness 
of the material order of things and of its Maker. He deleted as interpolations all texts in 
the New Testament that assumed…the order and goodness of matter.”83 Thus, Mani, and 
consequently Manicheanism, was altogether opposed to the idea that the material world 
could be good. This was the intellectual atmosphere in which Augustine was living prior 
to his conversion to Christianity. Indeed, Augustine’s acceptance of the essential 
goodness of matter would be a large factor in his rejection of Manicheanism and 
conversion to Christianity. Augustine describes his entrance into Manicheanism thus: 
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Nesciebam enim aliud vere quod est, et quasi acutule movebar ut suffragarer 
stultis deceptoribus, cum a me quaererent unde malum, et utrum forma corporea 
deus finiretur et haberet capillos et ungues,84  
 
“But I did not know that other reality which truly is; and through my own 
sharpness I let myself be taken in by fools, who deceived me with such questions 
as: Whence comes evil? And is God bounded by a bodily shape and has he hair 
and nails?”85  
 
He then proceeds to discuss how his failure to understand that evil is an absence of good, 
not a real thing, and his failure to understand that God is a spirit led him to accept these 
questions of the Manicheans as real objections to mainstream Christianity and thus to fall 
in with them.86 Thus, while Plotinus, like the Manichees, believes that matter is a real 
thing, Augustine has to come to a deeper, different understanding of the material world 
and the nature of God in order to move beyond his Manicheanism. This, in turn, forces 
him to have a much more developed understanding of and respect for the material world 
than Plotinus, who was never so intimately involved in a Gnostic sect like the 
Manicheans. 
 Augustine speaks very clearly about the goodness of creation and even matter in a 
prayer addressed to God at the beginning of Book 5:  
non cessat nec tacet laudes tuas universa creatura tua, nec spiritus omnis per os 
conversum ad te87, nec animalia nec corporalia per os considerantium ea, ut 
exsurgat in te a lassitudine anima nostra, innitens eis quae fecisti et transiens ad 
te, qui fecisti haec mirabiliter. et ibi refection et vera fortitude,88  
 
“Without ceasing Thy whole creation speaks Thy praise—the spirit of every man 
by the words that his mouth directs to Thee, animals and lifeless matter by the 
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mouth of those who look upon them: that so our soul rises out of its mortal 
weariness unto Thee, helped upward by the things Thou hast made and passing 
beyond them unto Thee who hast wonderfully made them: and there refreshment 
is and strength unfailing.”89  
 
Thus, created things are capable of communicating to human beings something of God 
and leading the human soul above them up to God Himself. Especially worthy of note is 
the inclusion of material things, even soulless ones, in those things that praise God and 
lead the soul to Him. Whereas Plotinus is especially inclined to associate material, 
soulless things with evil, Augustine explicitly states that these things are a means by 
which God raises the soul to Himself. The passage shows balance, moreover, because the 
soul is clearly not supposed to stop or seek its rest in these material things, but to use 
them in the ascent to God. Augustine, then, does not reject material things as evil, but 
neither does he claim them as the soul’s primary good. 
 Confessions X.6.9 presents a similar picture of the material world and its 
relationship to God. In response to Augustine asking various things in the created world 
whether they are God, they respond in a way, saying as it were, ‘non sum’ and ‘non 
sumus deus tuus; quaere super nos,’90 “’I am not He’” and “’We are not your God; seek 
higher.’”91 Thus, once more the material world shows itself capable of directing the 
human soul to ascend to God by denying its own divinity. Augustine responds to creation 
thus, et dixi omnibus his quae circumstant fores carnis meae, ‘dicite mihi de deo meo, 
quod vos non estis, dicite mihi de illo aliquid,92 “And I said to all the things that throng 
about the gateways of the senses: ‘Tell me of my God, since you are not He. Tell me 
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something of Him.”93 To this the sensory things respond loudly, ipse fecit nos,94 “He 
made us.”95 Thus, sensory things direct Augustine’s attention to the God, Who is above 
sensory things by telling him that they were created by Him. If, as in a Plotinian 
worldview, the material things only existed by derivation and had evil matter mixed in 
with them, they would not be so helpful in the soul’s search for God, but would only 
present a distraction in the search; in an Augustinian worldview, however, the personal 
God intentionally creates the material world as a sign to communicate himself to human 
beings and so He has a closer connection to both the material world and the human 
beings than in Platonic thought. Creation is thus directed towards God; it does not merely 
exist because of Him. 
 In Book 7, when Augustine is discussing his conversion from false Manichaean 
doctrine and other false doctrines, Augustine once more shows the good of the material 
and created world. As with Plotinus’s considerations of the material world, so too 
Augustine in his considerations of the created world considers the extent to which created 
things exist: 
Et inspexi cetera infra te et vidi nec omnino esse nec omnino non esse: esse 
quidem, quoniam abs te sunt, non esse autem, quoniam id quod es non sunt. id 
enim vere est quod incommutabiliter manet,96  
 
“Then I thought upon those other things that are less than You, and I saw that they 
neither absolutely are nor yet totally are not: they are, in as much as they are from 
You: they are not, in as much as they are not what You are. For that truly is, 
which abides unchangeably.”97  
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Thus, God truly exists while all other things, spiritual or material, have existence, but not 
full existence to the same extent as God, who cannot be changed or destroyed, has. It 
should be noted that whereas Plotinus allows full existence to the Intellect and the Soul 
and denies true existence to the material world, Augustine recognizes that the spiritual 
realities, while higher than the material realities, lack full existence just like the material 
realities. Thus, the ontological lowness of the material world cannot make it any more 
inherently evil than the spiritual world. Indeed, the spiritual world seems for Augustine to 
be capable of worse evil than the material world. 
 It is also helpful to consider just what Augustine says in the Confessions about the 
similarities and differences between his and Plotinus’ understanding of God and the 
material world. Augustine first presents his own encounter with the books of the 
Platonists as an act of God for Augustine’s salvation.98Augustine summarizes what he 
learned from those books with a quotation from the Gospel of John:  
in principio erat verbum et verbum erat apud deum et deus erat verbum. hoc erat 
in principio apud deum. omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. 
quod factum est in eo vita est, et vita erat lux hominum; et lux in tenebris lucet, et 
tenebrae eum non comprehenderunt,99  
 
“in the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was 
God: the same was in the beginning with God; all things were made by Him and 
without Him was made nothing that was made; in Him was life and the life was 
the light of men, and the light shines in the darkness and the darkness did not 
comprehend it.”100  
 
Thus, Augustine finds an idea of the divine Verbum in the books of the Platonists. 
Presumably, Augustine is here equating Plotinus’ nou=j, the second hypostasis in 
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Plotinian metaphysics, with the Verbum, the second person in the Christian Trinity. He 
moreover finds the idea that this Verbum is the source of all created things. He also finds 
the idea that the Verbum is beyond the power of evil, here represented by tenebrae, 
darkness.  
After quoting further from the Prologue to the Gospel of John where it talks about 
the role of the Verbum in the world’s creation, Augustine then quotes the Gospel of John 
to show the things that do not appear in the books of the Platonists, namely the 
incarnation of the Verbum and the role of the incarnation in salvation history: in sua 
propria venit et sui eum non receperunt, quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis 
potestatem filios dei fieri credentibus in nomine eius,101 “He came unto His own, and His 
own received Him not, but to as many as received Him He gave power to be made the 
sons of God, to them that believed in His name.”102 To make this difference even more 
clear, Augustine says, Item legi ibi quia verbum, deus, non ex carne, non ex sanguine, 
non ex voluntate viri neque ex voluntate carnis, sed ex deo natus est; sed quia verbum 
caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, non ibi legi,103 “Again I found in them that the 
Word, God, was born not of flesh nor of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, but of God; but 
I did not find that the Word became flesh.”104 Thus, Augustine reads in the books of the 
Platonists that the Verbum, being God, has its origin in God, not in human beings or 
human birth. What he does not find in the books is that the Verbum was made a human 
being with real human flesh, living among men. This is, of course, something that 
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Plotinus could never say. Even when Plotinus presents a more positive image of the 
material world, the idea that the Intellect would or even could in any way take on a 
material form is beyond the realm of Plotinian metaphysics. Moreover, in Plotinian 
thought, where the material world is rarely anything but a distraction from the pursuit of 
the Intellect and the One, if the Intellect were to become a human being, it does not seem 
as though this incarnation of Intellect would bring about a positive result because to 
Plotinus’ mind it would be a lowering and defiling of the Intellect. The incarnation of the 
Verbum suggests that there is something good or at least capable of being saved about the 
material world.  
Because of their failure to understand the incarnation, Augustine, citing Paul’s 
Letter to the Romans, speaks contemptuously of the Neoplatonists:  
etsi cognoscunt deum, non sicut deum glorificant aut gratias agunt, sed 
evanescent in cogitationibus suis et obscuratur insipiens cor eorum; dicentes se 
esse sapientes stulti facti sunt.105  
 
“and if they know God, they have not glorified him as God or given thanks: but 
become vain in their thoughts; and their foolish heart is darkened. Professing 
themselves to be wise they become fools.106  
 
Augustine himself is initially made overly proud by the wisdom that he finds in the books 
of the Platonists:  
iam enim coeperam velle videri sapiens plenus poena mea et non flebam, insuper 
et inflabar scientia. ubi enim erat illa aedificans caritas a fundamento humilitatis, 
quod est Christus Iesus?, 107  
 
“For I had begun to wish to appear wise, and this indeed was the fullness of my 
pusnishment; and I did not weep for my state, but was badly puffed up with my 
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knowledge. Where was that charity which builds us up upon the foundation of 
humility, which is Christ Jesus?”108  
 
Thus, for Augustine, understanding of Platonism was as much a danger as it was an aid. 
Augustine fell into pride over his wisdom. The only cure was the one thing not found in 
the books of the Platonists, Christ Jesus, that is to say, the Verbum incarnate. Only belief 
in Christ, who humbled himself to become like men, could save Augustine by teaching 
him humility.  
At the very end of Book VII, Augustine goes into further detail about just what 
the books of the Platonists lacked, which he found in the Christian Scriptures, especially 
the writings of St. Paul:  
quoniam iustus es, domine, nos autem peccavimus, inique fecimus, impie 
gessimus, et gravata est super nos manus tua, et iuste traditi sumus antiquo 
peccatori….quid faciet miser homo?,109  
 
“For Thou art just, O Lord, but we have sinned, we have committed iniquity, we 
have done wickedly and Thy hand has grown heavy upon us and we are justly 
delivered over to that first sinner….But what shall unhappy man do?”110  
 
Thus, the first thing Augustine mentions having found in the Scriptures is the whole of 
human history, full as it is of human sin. Sin makes the life of man and the entire sensory 
world in need of a savior. The Plotinian idea of ascending beyond the material world does 
not take into account the need for something more than intellectual enlightenment to save 
humankind from sin. Augustine, intimately familiar as he was with sin, knew that more 
was needed by sinners than mere intellectual enlightenment. As noted above, even 
understanding of the higher realities is capable of leading a human being astray into pride 
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apart from Christ. Augustine then cites Christ’s action in human history as what he 
learned from the Christian Scriptures:  
in quo princeps huius mundi non invenit quicquam morte dignum, et occidit eum? 
Et evacuatum est chirographum quod erat contrarium nobis…non habent illae 
paginae vultum pietatis huius, lacrimas confessionis, sacrificium tuum, spiritum 
contribulatum, cor contritum et humiliatum, populi salutem, sponsam civitatem, 
arram spiritus sancti, poculum pretii nostri,111  
 
“in whom the prince of this world found nothing worthy of death yet killed Him; 
and the handwriting was blotted out of the decree which was contrary to 
us….Their pages show nothing of the face of love, the tears of confession, Your 
sacrifice, an afflicted spirit, a contrite and humbled heart, the salvation of Your 
people, the espoused city, the promise of the Holy Spirit, the chalice of our 
redemption.”112  
 
The solution for humanity’s sinful actions within history is for God, through the 
Verbum’s incarnation, to become directly active in human history. That this is so is 
pointed to especially strongly when Augustine references Pontius Pilate not finding 
Christ guilty, a particular historical event. For Augustine, salvation must lie in something 
more than knowledge of spiritual realities; it must be joined to the material reality by the 
actions of God in history, as well as the actions of God and the individual in the 
individual’s own life. The particular example of God acting in history that is of concern 
to Augustine in the Confessions, as suggested by the words lacrimas confessionis, “the 
tears of confession,” is his own confession of his life.  The Confessions are a narration of 
God’s action is his life and a means for Augustine and others to receive or at least 
perceive the grace of God. This is what gives the Confessions such great power, both 
spiritually and rhetorically; this is why the use of first person and second person pronouns 
to refer to the intimate relationship of God and Augustine are so essential to Augustine’s 
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writing throughout the Confessions. Augustine, having developed his identity in the 
context of the Judaeo-Christian culture, knows that the actions of God in history, even the 
individual’s personal history, are essential to the salvation of all men. Plotinus, however, 
has no such background, so he does not focus on his own personal experience of the One, 
but rather seeks to give an impersonal discussion and description of his philosophy. To 
discuss personal details would seem to Plotinus to distract from the higher realities with 
the mundane details of the material reality.  
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Section Seven: Augustine on Evil 
Augustine’s positive attitude towards the material world can be seen in his 
understanding of evil as not matter, but as a lack of goodness and a failure of the soul to 
seek God as its greatest good. In Book 7 of the Confessions, Augustine discusses the 
inherent goodness of quae corrumpuntur, “corruptible things”:  
Et manifestum est mihi quoniam bona sunt quae corrumpuntur, quae neque si 
summa bona essent neque nisi bona essent corrumpi possent; quia si summa bona 
essent, incorruptibilia essent, si autem nulla bona essent, quid in eis 
corrumperetur non esset. nocet enim corruptio et, nisi bonum minueret, non 
noceret,113  
 
“And it became clear to me that corruptible things are good: if they were 
supremely good they could not be corrupted, but also if they were not good at all 
they could not be corrupted: if they were supremely good they would be 
incorruptible, if they were in no way good there would be nothing in them that 
might corrupt. For corruption damages; and unless it diminished goodness, it 
would not damage.”114  
 
Thus, while created things are lower beings than the supreme being, God himself, they 
are still good. This is clear because things that are not good at all cannot be made worse, 
but created things, material and spiritual, are capable of becoming worse. In mentioning 
this corruptio, Augustine points towards what he will present as the true evil, not material 
things, but the movement of good things away from God; when referring to spiritual evil, 
Augustine refers to this movement as iniquitas, “iniquity”:  
et quaesivi quid esset iniquitas et non inveni substantiam, sed a summa 
substantia, te deo, detortae in infima voluntatis perversitatem, proicientis intima 
sua et tumescentis foras,115  
 
“So that when I now asked what is iniquity, I realized that it was not a substance 
but a swerving of the will which is turned towards lower things and away from 
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You, O God, who are the supreme substance: so that it casts away what is most 
inward to it and swells greedily for outward things.”116  
 
Thus, iniquity for Augustine is losing what is most inward to oneself by going away from 
God, Who is most inward to the human person, in the pursuit of lesser goods, which are 
nevertheless goods. Not even the fact that the soul can be distracted by these things 
makes them fundamentally evil. Moreover, Augustine asserts the importance of having 
lower things even if they are sometimes the object of a sinful will because non iam 
desiderabam meliora, quia omnia cogitabam, et meliora quidem superiora quam 
inferiora, sed meliora omnia quam sola superior iudicio saniore pendebam,117 “I no 
longer desired better, because I had thought upon them all and with clearer judgment I 
realised that while certain higher things are better than lower things, yet all things 
together are better than the higher alone.”118 Thus, while the spiritual goods are better 
than the material goods, the world is better because it has both the spiritual and material 
goods. Men, then, cannot reject what is material and treat it as evil, but should rather 
pursue all goods, material and spiritual, in their proper order and way.119 
  Augustine further shows the possibility of evil arising from the pursuit of 
perceived spiritual goods as well as material goods when describing his adolescent theft 
of the pears in Book 2. About the cause of this theft, Augustine writes,  
et ego furtum facere volui et feci, nulla compulsus egestate nisi penuria et fastidio 
iustitiae et sagina iniquitatis. nam id furatus sum quod mihi abundabat et multo 
melius, nec ea re volebam frui quam furto appetebam, sed ipso furto et peccato,120  
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“Yet I chose to steal, and not because want drove me to it—unless a want of 
justice and contempt for it and an excess of iniquity. For I stole things which I 
already had in plenty and in better quality. Nor had I any desire to enjoy the 
things I stole, but only the stealing of them and the sin.”121  
Augustine was not seeking the material good of the pear, but was rather seeking the 
perceived spiritual good of the stealing of the pears. The cause of his sin was not the good 
of the pears, but penuria et fastidio iustitiae, “a want of justice and contempt for it.” He 
was spiritually deficient and so he committed the crime for its own sake or for pride’s 
sake. Friendship, which is very often considered to be a great good and more spiritual 
than material lead him to commit this crime, sed quoniam in illis pomis voluptas mihi non 
erat, ea erat in ipso facinore quam faciebat consortium simul peccantium,122 “But since 
the pleasure I got was not in the pears, it must have been in the crime itself, and put there 
by the companionship of others sinning with me.”123 For Augustine, then, the material 
world is, if anything, less a cause of evil than other spiritual beings, whether they be 
humans or pure spirits.124 The material world and all that is in it is inherently good and 
does not cause iniquity; rather, iniquity is the turning of the will away from God to other 
perceived goods, whether they be material or spiritual. Thus, for Augustine, all of the 
created world, spiritual and material, is capable of showing the goodness of the Christian 
God. Unsurprisingly, then, Augustine, while seeing the potential weaknesses of words, 
still recognizes that they have a powerful place in the communicating the Truth of the 
Christian faith to others. 
                                                             
121 Confessions, II.4.9.29. 
122 Confessions, II.8.16.22. 
123 Confessions, II.8.16.33. 
124 It is worth noting that this emphasis on the fact that a spiritual thing can cause evil as well as a material 
thing is in line with mainstream Christian thought, which, after all, suggests that the cause of the first 
human sin was the temptation by Satan, an angel; moreover, the cause of Satan’s sin could not be material 
since he is purely spiritual and thus not capable of being affected by the material world. 
 43 
  
 44 
Section Eight: Augustine on Words 
 Whereas Plotinus seems not to favor words as vehicles for conveying truth, at 
least about the One, Augustine presents a more complex and varied attitude towards 
words. He is doubtful about their power to convey truth while writing his early dialogue, 
De Magistro. The De Magistro, written by Augustine in or around 389 AD is a dialogue 
between Augustine and his teenage son Adeodatus about the effect and power of 
speech.125 On the other hand, later on, having becoming a Christian preacher, perhaps 
even a bishop, whose work is inseparable from words, perhaps in 395 AD, he writes an 
entire work, the De Doctrina Christiana, on the proper use of and interpretation of words 
for conveying the Christian religion. 126 More generally, the work is also about the power 
of signs, sensory things, to convey reality. 
 In the De Magistro, Augustine argues that words are incapable of truly teaching. 
Augustine writes, “Before I made that discovery the word was merely a sound to me. It 
became a sign when I had learned the thing of which it was the sign. And this I had 
learned not from signs but from seeing the actual object. So the sign is learned from 
knowing the thing, rather than vice versa.”127 Words lack actual meaning until human 
beings impart meaning to them. Moreover, human beings are only capable of imparting 
this meaning as a result of learning that occurs prior to the imparting of meaning. Thus, 
words are incapable of actually teaching, being rather a thing to be learned. As Augustine 
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writes further, “In a sign there are two things, sound and meaning. We perceive the sound 
when it strikes our ear, while the meaning becomes clear when we look at the thing 
signified.”128 Augustine states his thesis most clearly when he writes, “What I am really 
trying to convince you of, if I can, is this. We learn nothing by means of these signs we 
call words. On the contrary, as I said, we learn the force of the word, that is the meaning 
which lies in the sound of the word, when we come to know the object signified by the 
word. Then only do we perceive that the word was a sign conveying that meaning.”129 
Words cannot teach. On the other hand, Augustine allows that words are capable of 
drawing a person’s attention towards realities, “The utmost value I can attribute to words 
is this. They bid us look for things, but they do not show them to us so that we may know 
them.”130 Similarly, when establishing Christ as the real Teacher, Augustine writes, “We 
listen to Truth which presides over our minds within us, though of course we may be 
bidden to listen by someone using words.”131 Augustine also grants that useful belief may 
result from communication occurring by means of words, “Wherefore in matters which 
are discerned by the mind, whoever cannot discern them for himself listens vainly to the 
words of him who can, except that it is useful to believe such things so long as ignorance 
lasts.”132 Moreover, Augustine, perhaps referring to what would eventually become the 
De Doctrina, writes in the last paragraph of the work, “At another time, if God permit, 
we shall inquire into the whole problem of the usefulness of words, for their usefulness 
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properly considered is not slight.”133 Thus, even when arguing that words cannot teach, 
Augustine says emphatically that words are useful. 
 In the De Doctrina, Augustine writes more extensively about the usefulness of 
words and other signs for conveying truth and drawing people’s minds to God. Augustine 
begins by making a distinction in Book 1 between things which are to be enjoyed (frui), 
used (uti), and both used and enjoyed, Res ergo aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae 
quibus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur, “There are some things which are to be 
enjoyed, some which are to be used, and some whose function is both to enjoy and 
use.”134 Augustine defines enjoyment and use thus, Frui est enim amore inhaerere alicui 
rei propter se ipsam; uti autem, quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas obtinendum 
referre, si tamen amandum est, “To enjoy something is to hold fast to it in love for its 
own sake. To use something is to apply whatever it may be to the purpose of obtaining 
what you love—if indeed it is something that ought to be loved.”135 Thus, the thing 
enjoyed is what a person loves as an end in itself and the thing used is a means to 
obtaining that end. After Augustine uses a metaphor to compare people in the world to 
travelers trying to return to their fatherland, he concludes that the world and the things in 
it are to be used as a means of reaching our heavenly homeland with God: 
sic in huius mortalitatis vita peregrinantes a domino, si redire in patriam volumus 
ubi beati esse possumus, utendum est hoc mundo, non fruendum, ut invisibilia dei 
per ea quae facta sunt intellect conspiciantur, hoc est ut de corporalibus 
temporalibusque rebus aeterna et spiritalia capiamus,  
 
“So in this mortal life we are like travelers away from our Lords: if we wish to 
return to the homeland where we can be happy we must use this world, not enjoy 
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it, in order to discern ‘the invisible attributes of God, which are understood 
through what has been made or, in other words, to ascertain what is eternal and 
spiritual from corporeal and temporal things.”136  
 
Thus, this material and sensory world is a means of reaching heaven; men can do this by 
learning more about heaven from the material world. Just as Plotinus does not think that 
men ought to cease seeking the Intellect and the One, so too Augustine does not think 
that men ought to rest in this world; however, where Plotinus for the most part comes out 
against much engagement with the material world, Augustine sees the material world as 
something helpful in the pursuit of the things beyond the material world, namely, 
spiritual reality and especially God. A little further on, Augustine, after granting that 
speech can never express God who is ineffabilis, “unspeakable,”137 says nevertheless that 
God  
admisit humanae vocis obsequium et verbis nostris in laude sua gaudere nos 
voluit. Nam inde est et quod dicitur deus. Non enim re vera in strepitu istarum 
duarum syllabarum ipse cognoscitur, sed tamen omnes latinae linguae socios, 
cum aures eorum sonus iste tetigerit, movet ad cogitandam excellentissimam 
quondam immortalemque naturam,  
 
“has sanctioned the homage of the human voice, and chosen that we should derive 
pleasure from our words in praise of him. Hence the fact that he is called God: he 
himself is not truly known by the sound of these two syllables, yet when the word 
strikes our ears it leads all users of the Latin language to think of a supremely 
excellent and immortal being.”138  
 
Thus, as suggested in The Teacher, even if words, which are material things, cannot fully 
express a material thing, let alone God, they can draw a person’s attention towards God 
because they do have an understood meaning imparted by imparted by society. Therefore 
Christians ought to make use of words to lead others to God. 
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 Book 2 has more to say about the function of words as given signs. Augustine 
defines given signs thus, Data vero signa sunt quae sibi quaeque viventia invicem dant 
ad demonstrandos quantum possunt motus animi sui vel sense aut intellecta quaelibet,  
“Given signs are those which living things give to each other, in order to show, to the 
best of their ability, the emotions of their minds, or anything they have felt or learnt.”139 
Augustine gives his reason for discussing given signs:  
Horum igitur signorum genus, quantum ad homines attinet, considerare atque 
tractare statuimus, quia et signa divinitus data quae scripturis sanctis continentur 
per homines nobis indicate sunt qui ea conscripserunt,  
 
“It is this category are signs—to the extent that it applies to humans—that I have 
decided to examine and discuss, because even the divinely given signs contained 
in the holy scriptures have been communicated to us by the human beings who 
wrote them.”140 
   
Thus, in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, God has used humans and human words to 
convey truth to human beings. Words are especially important, as Augustine notes, 
because Verba enim prorsus inter homines obtinuerunt principatum significandi 
quaecumque animo concipiuntur, si ea quisque prodere velit, “Words have gained an 
altogether dominant role among humans in signifying the ideas conceived by the mind 
that person wants to reveal.”141 He moreover explicitly allows for and encourages the 
study of languages:  
Sed haec tota pars humanorum institutorum, quae ad usum vitae necessarium 
proficient, nequaquam est fugienda Christiano, immo etiam quantum satis est 
instituenda memoriaque retinenda,  
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“This whole area of human institutions which contribute to the necessities of life 
should in no way be avoided by the Christian; indeed, within reason, they should 
be studied and committed to memory,”142  
 
and ea vero, quae homines cum hominibus habent, assumenda, in quantum non 
sunt luxuriosa atque superflua, et maxime litterarum figurae, sine quibus legere 
non possumus, linguarumque varietas quantum satis est, de qua superius 
disputavimus,   
 
“those which men practise along with their fellow-men are to be adopted, in so far 
as they are not self-indulgent and superfluous. This applies especially to the 
letters of the alphabet, without which reading would be impossible, and (up to a 
point) to the multiplicity of languages, which I discussed above.”143  
 
Thus, Christians should seek familiarity with and understanding of languages because 
they can be helpful both in understanding the Scriptures and in conveying the truths of 
Christian religion. Augustine even exalts the Christian Scriptures over pagan, even 
Platonist, philosophy:  
mitescere opus est pietate neque contradicere divinae scripturae sive intellectae, 
si aliqua vitia nostra percutit, sive non intellectae, quasi nos melius sapere 
meliusque praecipere possimus, sed cogitare potius et credere id esse melius et 
verius quod ibi scriptum est, etiam si lateat, quam id quod nos per nos ipsos 
sapere possumus,  
 
“it is necessary, through holiness, to become docile, and not contradict holy 
scripture—whether we understand it (as when it hits at some of our vices) or fail 
to understand it (as when we feel that we could by ourselves gain better 
knowledge or give better instruction)—but rather ponder and believe that what is 
written there, even if obscure, is better and truer than any insights that we may 
gain by our own efforts.”144  
 
So, rather than philosophical insights obtained through reason without the aid of the 
divinely inspired Scriptures, Christians should use the words of Scripture as their guide. 
Moreover, Augustine even goes so far as to commend the study of eloquence:  
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Sunt etiam quaedam precept uberioris disputationis quae iam eloquentia 
nominatur, quae nihilominus vera sunt, quamvis eis possint etiam falsa 
persuaderi; sed quia et vera possunt, non est facultas ipsa culpabilis, sed ea male 
utentium perversitas,  
 
“There are also certain rules of the more flamboyant discipline now called 
eloquence, which are valid in spite of the fact that they can be used to commend 
falsehood. Since they can also be used to commend the truth, it is not the subject 
itself that is reprehensible, but the perversity of those who abuse it.”145  
 
He moreover proceeds to state that the realities which the rules of eloquence describe are 
not human institutions, but rather observations of the nature of things, which is ordained 
by God.146 Thus, Augustine goes further than encouraging just a basic understanding of 
language; Christians, especially preachers, should develop persuasive speech in the 
service of the spread of Christian religion. This is permissible because they are striving to 
win hearts and minds over to the truth, not to deceive others with lies, and because words 
are not fundamentally evil. 
 Augustine presents similar ideas about the nature of human language in the 
Confessions when discussing how he learned to speak and how he learned rhetoric in 
school. Augustine’s initial understanding of human speech came not from people 
attempting to teach it to him, but rather from his own observation of his elders and their 
communication with each other.147 Augustine as an infant recognized that the things 
towards which others were gesturing had the name which they were speaking:  
cum ipsi appellabant rem aliquam et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid 
movebant, videbam et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam quod sonabant cum 
eam vellent ostendere,148  
“[I observed that] my elders would make some particular sound, and as they made 
it would point at or move towards some particular thing: and from this I came to 
                                                             
145 De Doctrina Christiana, II.132.118-9. 
146 De Doctrina Christiana, II.132.118-9. 
147 Confessions, I.8.13.7. 
148 Confessions, I.8.13.7. 
 51 
realise that the thing was called by the sound they made when they wished to 
draw my attention to it.”149  
 
Augustine affirms that his understanding of human language made him capable of 
expressing his mind to others, writing, sic cum his inter quos eram voluntatum 
enuntiandarum signa communicavi,150 “Thus I learnt to convey what I meant to those 
about me.”151 Language, then, as in his other works, is a given sign that can be learned. 
He also points to the fact that the language he learned was a social construction, writing, 
et vitae humanae procellosam societatem altius ingressus sum,152 “and so took another 
long step along the stormy way of human life in society.”153 While Augustine wishes that 
he had not in his childhood studies spent so much time on empty matters, like the myths 
of the poets, he acknowledges that having learned to speak and write so well is useful to 
him now in the service of God, didici enim in eis multa verba utilia,154 “Among those 
studies, I learnt many a useful word.”155 He also shows the potential of words in 
preaching the Gospel when he prays, ecce enim tu, domine, re meus et deus meus, tibi 
serviat quidquid utile puer didici, tibi serviat quod loquor et scribo et lego et numero, 
156“O Lord, my King and my God: may whatever of value I learnt as a boy be used for 
Thy service, and what I now do in speaking and writing and reading and figuring.”157 
Thus, in more than just the De Doctrina, Augustine asserts the power of words to convey 
truth and the usefulness therefore of words to Christians as well as pagans. His belief in 
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the power of words for conveying the Christian message, as well as his strong rhetorical 
education, enable him to write about Beauty more beautifully and in a more impactful 
way than Plotinus with his strong distrust of the material world and especially words; 
Augustine, understanding both the strength and weakness of words, is able to take 
advantage of both in order to make his writing especially powerful. 
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Section Nine: Confessions X.27.38 Analysis 
 The personal nature of Augustine’s God contributes greatly to the rhetorical 
effectiveness of Confessions X.27.38. One especially clear way in which Augustine 
utilizes this personal nature is in his use of personal pronouns and verbs in the first and 
second person throughout Confessions X.27.38 and throughout the whole of the 
Confessions. Although Plotinus does use the second person in “On Beauty,” it refers to a 
very different person than Augustine’s second person. Thus its effect is far from 
Augustine’s use of te in the Confessions. In “On Beauty,” the “you” is not the One or 
even Intellect or Soul, but his reader. Plotinus’ use of the pronoun “you” keeps the text 
entirely on a horizontal level, at the level of reading, not aiding in the experience of 
higher realities. If anything, it pulls the mind and heart away from the higher realities and 
back to oneself or the text. Thus, insofar as Enneads I.6 “On Beauty” is a dialogue, it is a 
dialogue between man and man. The Confessions, on the other hand, use the “you” 
vertically for a dialogue, rather a prayer, between Augustine and God Himself.158 Thus, 
the reader is taken out of himself and into Augustine’s heart and mind and even beyond 
that to the Eternal “You” that is God, Beauty Himself. Augustine brings the reader into 
his own inner life, making the reader enter into his prayer to God, because ultimately the 
Confessions are not a philosophical tract talking about God, but rather a prayer addressed 
to God, a prayer in which the reader is enabled to take part through the writing down of 
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the Confessions. Plotinus talks around the One, Augustine talks to his personal God. 
Plotinus can only engage in abstract philosophizing. Augustine must engage in concrete 
dialogue with and prayer to God Himself. How can he do other when for him Truth is the 
incarnate, personal Word Himself? Direct address is ultimately the way to encounter such 
a God. Augustine, like Plotinus, may understand that he cannot ever truly grasp, ever 
truly comprehend the totality of God, but to fail to approach Him personally would be to 
weaken, not strengthen his pursuit of Beauty. Moreover, this attempt by a finite creature, 
who is very conscious of his finitude, to approach the infinite leads to a great deal of 
creative tension that can be seen especially clearly in Confessions X.27.36, but which can 
also be seen throughout the Confessions. In many ways, Plotinus has an easier problem at 
hand when he comes to write the Enneads; he can, for the most part, allow the One to be 
distant and beyond the realm of human experience. Augustine can never do that because 
the action of God in Augustine’s life and the concern of God for Augustine are utterly 
essential to the narrative fabric of the Confessions. The Confessions are at their most 
basic the story of how God becomes incarnate in the realities of Augustine’s own life, the 
story of Augustine both rejecting attachment to the material world and finding God in the 
material world. The Enneads, in so far as they have any connection to Plotinus’ own life, 
reveal rather Plotinus’ flight from the sensory toward the One, from one thing to 
something else. 
 In Confessions X.27.38, Augustine’s praise of Divine Beauty is full of creative 
tension. The tension is first centered on the relationship of God to time. Augustine 
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describes Beauty as tam antiqua et tam nova,159 “so ancient and so new.”160 This is not a 
false tension in which one of the opposing qualities is the true quality and the other only 
seems to be. Rather, Beauty is utterly ancient and utterly new to the same degree, if 
unboundedness can truly be described as a degree, as indicated by the addition of the 
qualifier tam not to only antiqua nor only to nova, but to both. Nor does even the 
placement of tam suggest any difference in how the word is applied to either adjective, 
but rather tam takes the same relative place to each word, immediately preceding each. 
Augustine in this manner shows Beauty’s utter transcendence of all that is temporal, by 
affirming as true of Beauty the extremes of temporality and thus sending the mind of the 
reader into the space in between the two ideas. By describing God as equally ancient and 
new, he in fact points to the fact that God is utterly beyond time, neither truly new nor 
old, but something which encompasses in it what is most excellent of both newness and 
oldness. The repetition of tam is similar to the repetition of poi/ouj noted in the section 
on Enneads I.6. There are very clear differences, however; Augustine is modifying two 
words with opposing meanings and is speaking of God himself. Plotinus is modifying 
two words with more or less the same meaning and is describing the person pursuing the 
One. In both instances, great rhetorical and perhaps even emotional emphasis is placed on 
the words modified, but, in the case of Augustine’s writing, the emphasis is far stronger 
and more intense precisely because it is used to heighten the contrast between a pair of 
opposites and is, moreover, applied to the transcendent God. 
                                                             
159 Confessions, X.27.38.134. 
160 Confessions, X.27.38.210. 
 56 
The use of temporal words does not, however, cease with antiqua and nova, but 
the description of Beauty is sandwiched between the repetition of the phrase, sero te 
amavi,161 “Late have I loved Thee,”162 with its temporal adverb, in this case not applied to 
Beauty, but rather to Augustine and his action of loving Beauty. This creates a threefold 
tension within the first sentence of the passage. Not only is there tension within the 
description of God’s temporality or lack thereof, but there is also a tension between 
God’s transcendence of time and Augustine’s being bounded by time and not only being 
bounded by time but failing to even act quickly within time. Augustine, unlike God, is 
not described with two equally strong opposing modifying words, but rather with one 
modifier, sero. What produces specificity in this passage is Augustine’s temporality, 
much more than God’s transcendence of all that is temporal. Even the use of the 
modifiers referring to God emphasizes the space in between those the ideas represented 
by those words as much as the use of those modifiers defines God in any particularly 
concrete way. 
The tension within God’s relationship to Augustine becomes even more primary 
in the following sentence. Beauty is described as intus, “within,” in opposition to 
Augustine’s foris, 163  “outside.”164 Augustine is thus making use of an antithetical pair of 
words to strengthen the creative tension within the passage.165 Moreover, Augustine 
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seeks God foris instead of intus, where he can be found. To further complicate things, 
even though Augustine is elsewhere than Beauty, Beauty is still with Augustine and yet 
Augustine is not with Beauty. Augustine in this way points to the complexities of 
spiritual presence. God is always with Augustine since God is omnipresent and since 
Augustine’s soul can only exist by inhering in God, but Augustine, being a being less 
than Being Himself, can choose not to be consciously in God’s presence by seeking the 
other things, which he sought as if they were God himself. That Augustine seeks the 
other things as gods is seen when he writes, ibi te quaerebam, “I sought you there,”166 
where ibi, “there,” refers to foris, which is shortly further specified as in ista formosa,167 
“upon those lovely things.”168 Thus, to be with another in the spiritual sense used in this 
passage is to have one’s attention directed to the other. The pairs of contraries in this 
sentence, like intus and foris are used by Augustine to bring out the complexity of the 
relationship between a time-bound, finite being and eternal, infinite Being. It makes no 
sense if one thinks in human terms for a person to be far away from God at the same time 
as God is intimately close to that person. One would more likely expect that the 
individual’s rejection of God would remove God from the individual, but instead the 
distance is one-sided. 
Indeed, this Creator-creature tension is shown to be the primary tension in the 
passage when Augustine writes, et in ista formosa quae fecisti, deformis irruebam,169 
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“and I, deformed, was rushing upon those well-formed things which you made.”170 
Augustine opposes the formosa, “well-formed,” things which God created and Augustine 
sought with himself, deformis, “deformed.” These two words can hardly be more clearly 
antonyms. These things are good, having their form from Beauty Himself, the source of 
form, while Augustine was deformed because of his failure to live up to his form, the 
nature given to him by God. Instead of seeing and seeking the God to Whom they 
pointed, he sought the things themselves as if they were God. Interestingly, a point of 
departure from Plotinus is that Augustine does not consider these material things 
altogether harmful in the pursuit of God; they are in fact images of God Himself, as 
suggested by formosa.171 God is Himself, for Augustine, the first Form whence all other 
forms and formed things come.172 This heightens the tension in the passage because all 
out rejection and denial of the good of these formed things is not possible; rather, 
Augustine and his reader must seek the middle road between the two extremes. 
Augustine, having intellectually worked through the problems with Manicheanism, 
cannot deny goodness to created things. For that to be the case, God would have had to 
create evil things or there would have had to have been some other principle of creation 
operating that is opposed to God. Neither option is tenable for the Christian Augustine. 
Thus, Augustine, seeking to remain in between the two extremes maintains the tension 
that arises when a simple solution cannot be given to an intellectual problem. Augustine 
may present a solution: Creation is a good, but not the highest good. That solution, 
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however, leaves the practical response to the created world fraught with complication. 
Certainly, God must always be sought first, but how is one to seek God while at the same 
time appreciating the goodness and beauty in created things? Plotinus says that the one 
who has seen Beauty Itself spurns all lower forms of beauty, which are doubtless 
essentially the same as Augustine’s formosa. His solution is thus simpler and more 
straightforward in many ways than Augustine’s. The reader can see the sense Plotinus’ 
writing makes and then move on. The tension Augustine creates makes the reader’s 
attention delay on the passage, wondering how he is to respond to this not entirely 
resolved tension, marveling in wonder, and perhaps fear, at the work of the God Who 
made the world so beautifully beyond comprehension and Who is Himself even more 
beyond comprehension. 
Still, the main tension in this clause is not between Augustine and those things but 
between the Creator, imparter of form to formless being, and His Creation. Whatever 
difference there may be arising from the actualization or not of a form, created things and 
Augustine still have in common that they are created things, with a form imparted to 
them by their Creator. Created things and God do not even have that in common; God is, 
for Augustine as well as for Plotinus, beyond created being, since He is Being Itself. This 
tension between Augustine’s impermanent being and God’s permanence as Being is the 
fundamental tension in the Confessions. Even here, there is an important difference 
between Augustine and Plotinus. For Plotinus, the One is not even Being, but rather the 
Intellect is Being; similarly, the One is formless, whereas Augustine’s God is the first 
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Form.173 God is constantly in the background, even when Augustine tries to remove Him 
from the foreground, ever present, ever influencing every step Augustine takes, ever the 
same. Augustine, for his part, while always present in the Confessions, and often front 
and center in the foreground, is never the same from one moment to the next. This is 
absolutely necessary because without it there would be no story to the Confessions. 
Augustine’s ability to change and repent is absolutely essential to his salvation, as God’s 
constancy and permanent sameness is utterly essential to His role as Augustine’s Savior, 
the one who always pursues Augustine and the constancy of Whose Beauty and 
Goodness allows Augustine to recognize Him as he newly appears, ever the same in 
every moment of Augustine’s search for Truth and ever startlingly new. 
The passage derives its power from the personal nature of God even more than 
from the tension between Creator and Creation. Throughout the passage, Augustine uses 
personal language to refer to himself and to God. The repeated sero te amavi emphasizes 
both of their personal natures using the pronoun te to refer to God and the first person 
form of the verb to point to Augustine. That Augustine should speak of himself in 
personal terms is not so surprising or striking, even Plotinus occasionally, albeit 
incredibly rarely, does that; it is far more startling for Augustine to refer to God as a 
“you.” This is, moreover, not solely restricted to this passage. The Confessions are 
nothing if not a dialogue with or a monologue addressed to God. God’s personal nature is 
essential to the very character of the Confessions. No longer, as in the Soliloquies, does 
Augustine address only himself or Reason. Here he addresses God Himself on intimate 
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terms. He addresses God as a person capable of real action, capable of acting intimately 
with individual humans, especially Augustine. This can be seen most clearly when he 
writes, Coruscasti, splenduisti, et fugasti caecitatem meam,174 “Thou didst send forth Thy 
beams and shine upon me and chase away my blindness.”175 All of the verbs emphasize 
God’s personhood by their use of the second person singular; moreover, the sentence 
emphasizes Augustine’s personhood by the use of the first person possessive pronoun. 
The sentence, then, shows God as an active agent in Augustine’s life, someone who 
actively affects Augustine. It is only through personal, active agency that God could heal 
Augustine in the way Augustine needed to be healed. In the sentences following that, 
Augustine shows how intimately God’s personal action is interwoven with his own 
personal action by interweaving the words describing his actions with those describing 
God’s actions: Fragrasti, et duxi spiritum, et anhelo tibi. Gustavi, et esurio, et sitio. 
Tetigisti me, et exarsi in pacem tuam,176 “Thou didst breath fragrance upon me, and I 
drew in my breath and do now pant for Thee: I tasted Thee, and now hunger and thirst for 
Thee: Thou didst touch me, and I have burned for Thy peace.”177  
The use of physical language to describe God in this passage is striking 
considering that the Confessions have been, on the whole, a description of Augustine’s 
journey from his false belief in a physical God to his belief, influenced by Plotinus, in an 
immaterial God. The shift to physical metaphors is taken here, perhaps, because the 
persons with whom humans are more conscious of interacting are other humans. 
                                                             
174 Confessions, X.27.38.134. 
175 Confessions, X.27.38.210. 
176 Confessions, X.27.38.134. 
177 Confessions, X.27.38.210. 
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Augustine, then, wants to emphasize God’s personal nature with words that suggest not 
just another person but a real lover, whose touch makes Augustine burn. Yet, Augustine 
must always preserve the distinction between physical human love and immaterial divine 
love, and so he adds in pacem tuam, “for Thy peace,” which cannot truly be said of any 
human love relationship. This, moreover, signals a difference between the presentation of 
love in Enneads I.6 because there the lover, ever longing, is always in a state of 
incomplete fulfillment of his love. For Augustine, the love for God can ultimately be 
fulfilled. This description of God as lover signals a real shift away from the 
Neoplatonism. God, for Plotinus, cannot be described as a lover.178 Humans are the ones 
that love for Plotinus, because they are the inferior ones seeking the superior Beauty. 
Humans can ascend from the love of material things to the love of immaterial things to 
love of the One, but it is always the humans, not the One that do the loving. For the One 
to be a lover would seem to Plotinus to make the One dependent on inferior beings, 
which can never be the case since the One is prior to all beings. 
Augustine does not only use paradox in Confessions X, but uses paradox 
throughout the Confessions to draw out the various tensions in creaturely existence and 
the relationship between a creature and a Creator God. At the beginning of the 
Confessions, in I.4.4. Augustine uses paradox in the form of antithetical word pairs in a 
                                                             
178 Even in Enneads VI.8, about which Armstrong in his introduction in the Loeb version of the text writes, 
“the language of will and love and thought is used about him, and he appears as something more like a 
‘personal God’ than he does elsewhere in the Enneads,” Plotinus qualifies his statements by saying that 
lambane/tw de\ kai\ to\ “oi(=on” e)f ) e(ka/stou, “one should understand ‘as if’ with each of them” 
(VI.8.13.50.270-1). Moreover, the love of the One seems to be directed not outwards to others but inwards 
towards itself, as when Plotinus writes, Kai\ e)ra/simon kai\ e)/rwj o( au)to\j kai\ au(tou= e)/rwj, a(/te ou)k 
a)/llwj kalo\j h0\ par ) au(tou= kai\ e)n au(tw=|, “And he, that same self, is lovable and love and love of 
himself, in that he is beautiful only from himself and in himself.” Plotinus, Enneads VI.8 “On Free Will 
and the Will of the One,” in Plotinus Enneads VI.6-9, ed. and trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), 15.1-2.276-77/ 
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similar manner and to a similar effect to the use of word pairs in Confessions X. After 
using a series of superlatives to refer to God with the words summe, optime, potentissime, 
omnipotentissime,179 “the greatest and the best, mightiest, almighty.”180 Augustine 
proceeds to use two words that while not strictly opposites are often thought of as 
opposites with reference to God, misericordissime et iustissime,181 “most merciful and 
most just.”182 Similarly, secretissime et praesentissime,183 “utterly hidden and utterly 
present,”184 are a pair of antithetical words, both of which are simultaneously applied to 
God. Indeed, this pair of words is even more clearly opposites that the previous word 
pair. Some of the word pairs, like immutabilis mutans omnia,185 “suffering no change and 
changing all things,”186 have their contrast in God’s nature as opposed to the nature He 
gives to the world. In another antithetical word pair, Augustine negates both members of 
the pair of words in order to refer to God qua God, numquam novus numquam vetus,187 
“never new, never old.”188 Indeed, this word pair is almost echoed in X.27.38 by tam 
antiqua et tam nova, except that tam is used in the latter to intensify the affirmation, 
whereas numquam, “never,” and its repetition serves to intensify the negation. In contrast 
to the numquam in that word pair, Augustine uses semper to intensify by affirmation, 
while still referring to God qua God, in semper agens semper quietus,189 “ever in action, 
                                                             
179 Confessions, I.4.4.4. The use of the vocative indicating, as in X.27.38, the first-person address of God is 
also worthy of note. 
180 Confessions, I.4.4.4. 
181 Confessions, I.4.4.4. 
182 Confessions, I.4.4.4. 
183 Confessions, I.4.4.4.  
184 Confessions, I.4.4.4. 
185 Confessions, I.4.4.4. 
186 Confessions, I.4.4.4-5. 
187 Confessions, I.4.4.4. 
188 Confessions, I.4.4.5. 
189 Confessions, I.4.4.5. 
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ever at rest.”190 In a similar manner to X.27.38, Augustine in this passage uses almost 
entirely paratactical constructions, using et or nec or, perhaps most powerful of all, using 
no connective word at all and simply allowing the opposing meanings of the words and 
the reader’s mind to fill in the space where the connection ought to be. 
Throughout the passage, Augustine uses active, second person verbs to refer to 
God and his action: eras, fecisti, vocasti, clamasti, rupisti, coruscasti, splenduisti, fugasti, 
fragrasti, and tetigisti. The first verb, being only a verb indicating being, while striking 
for its difference from the third person that is always used in Enneads I.6 to refer to the 
One, is less powerful than the other verbs, which derive even greater strength than the 
verbs in Plotinus from the fact that they make God an active agent. Whereas Plotinus may 
at times use a form of the verb “to be” in order to speak of the One in some manner, he 
rarely, if ever, uses verbs that make the One an agent as Augustine does. Augustine has 
no such hesitancy about making God an agent. God, as fecisti, “you made,” suggests, 
actively creates the world; the One seems disengaged in its emanation of the world. Thus, 
there is a more intimate, because intentional, connection between God and the created 
world. This more intimate connection may also allow Augustine to use more physical 
language when speaking of and to God. 
  Whereas Plotinus in Enneads I.6 tends toward hypotaxis, Augustine tends in 
Confessions X.27.38 toward parataxis. He does not use much subordination, even though, 
as a classically trained rhetor, incredibly familiar with Ciceronian prose, which is fully of 
complex sentences fully of hypotactically arranged clauses and phrases, Augustine was 
certainly capable of producing such sentences. Almost the only conjunction used in the 
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passage is the neutral et, which does not place one part of a sentence above the another, 
but gives them equal weight. While he does use relative conjunctions a few times in the 
passage, these do not create much hypotaxis. At times, Augustine even avoids using et 
where he could have. The only other conjunction he uses is si, which he only uses one 
time and only as is necessary for what he is saying. Erich Auerbach, writing in Mimesis 
of this style in another passage of the Confessions, notes: “The tone has something 
urgently impulsive, something human and dramatic, and the form exhibits a 
predominance of parataxes.191 Auerbach also notes that this use of parataxis is 
characteristic of Biblical Latin.192 Further on, he notes, “In all of these instances there is, 
instead of the causal or at least temporal hypotaxis which we should expect in classical 
Latin (whether with cum or postquam, whether with an ablative absolute or a participial 
construction) a parataxis with et; and this procedure, far from weakening the 
interdependence of the two events, brings it out most emphatically.”193 Thus, the use of 
parataxis in Augustine actually strengthens the relationship between the sets of opposites, 
giving the passage more dramatic and emotional force. In Confessions X.27.38, the use of 
parataxis produces a sense of rapidity and intensity. Each phrase is presented on its own, 
not affected or qualified by subordinate clauses, whether explicit or implicit. This is 
especially true of the end of the passage, where the reader is presented with a series of 
verbs, describing both the actions of God and of Augustine. At the end of the passage, 
several clauses consist solely of et and a single word. The longest clause in that part of 
                                                             
191 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis, trans. Willard Trask (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1957), 61. 
192 Auerbach, 61. 
193 Auerbach, 61-2. 
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the passage is the last clause in the passage. Thus, while he may not strictly use a 
Ciceronian tricolon, Augustine here uses an ascending style where he finishes with 
perhaps the most powerful image, containing within itself as it does an image that derives 
its effectiveness from its sensory character paired with its pair of opposites. Thus, in the 
final clause of the sentence, Augustine presents, on the one hand, a highly charged 
sensory image and, on the other hand, peace and God, Who is here indicated by the word 
tuam. 
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Section Ten: Conclusion 
 While Plotinus’ negative attitude towards the material world leads him to make 
less effective use of words in the passages considered, Augustine’s more complex 
understanding of the relationship between God and the created world leads him to a more 
complex style that derives a great deal of emotional energy from the use of antitheses 
necessitated by Augustine’s understanding of the inherent goodness of the world and the 
Christian God’s utter transcendence of the good world He has attentively created. 
Augustine’s understanding of God as personal, even intimate with human beings leads, 
moreover, to a more dramatic style. Unfortunately, this paper has only been able to 
consider one passage from each author. A great deal of work still needs to be done on 
other passages in the Confessions and the Enneads, as well as in all of the other works of 
Augustine. 
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